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THE IDEIA AND THE RIGHT TO AN "APPROPRIATE"
EDUCATION
Andrea Blau *

I. INTRODUCTION

What is an appropriate standard of education for disabled students?
The term appropriate has been used for over thirty years in federal
legislation to mandate to the states the standard. However, despite
numerous court rulings and legislative updates, the standard of an
appropriate education remains inconsistent and uncertain. It is clear that
the legislative standard of an appropriate education has risen over the
years but the courts that enforce the appropriate education standard
continue to be bound by the dated 1982 Supreme Court decision in
Rowley. Thus, when parents attempt to litigate the appropriateness of
their disabled child's education, the courts often hold the states to a
lower standard of appropriate than is implied in the legislation. A clear
definition of appropriate from an authoritative federal source is required
to force the courts and states to apply a consistent and more stringent
educational standard for disabled students that will lift education for
disabled students to the level of the congressional mandate. This paper
will discuss the contention and uncertainty caused by the lack of a clear
definition of an appropriate education* and will address the immediate
need for clarification of a standard that is in keeping with the higher
requirements intended by Congress.

J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; Ph.D., Speech & Hearing Sciences, City University of
New York. Dr. Blau has over three decades of experience in designing programs for uniquely
challenged students and has testified at impartial hearings and federal actions across the country. Her
current focus is on the interplay of Constitutional, Administrative, and Disability Law in shaping
public policy. She can be reached at afb@tiac.net.
*See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 212-18 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) ("! agree thut the
language of the Act does not contain a substantive standard beyond requiring that the education
offered must be 'appropriate."').
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[1. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AN "APPROPRIATE" EDUCATION

The most recent congressional directive, the Individuals with
1
Disability Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEIA), sustains an
ambitious legislative mission that began over thirty years ago. This
mission, of ensuring children with disabilities equality in educational
opportunities, has both resulted in and has been shaped by a dramatic
change in the way society views its responsibility towards its children.
Over the course of the past three decades, legislative intent has
progressed from simply increasing the number of challenged children
given physical access to the benefits of public education, to ensuring
children with disabilities cognitive access to the challenging public
education curriculum, as provided to all children, in preparation to live
2
adult independent lives.
This legislative mission began with the Education for All
3
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA). The EHA reflected a major
commitment to providing disabled youngsters with a public school
education. It was enacted, in part, as a societal and legislative reaction to
the de-institutionalization of disabled children, many of whom had been
neglected, considered uneducable, or excluded from any form of public
education. Under the EHA, local communities were held responsible for
educating these children, just as they were responsible for educating nondisabled children. This was a major step forward for local communities
because, prior to the EHA, the field of special education was still in its
infancy and the majority of teachers were untrained in methodologies
4
suitable for educating students with diverse disabilities.
In addition to demonstrating an initial desire and commitment to
provide educational opportunities to disabled youth, the EHA still
provides the basis of educational legislation today in two of its main
features: the mandate to provide to all children with disabilities (from
5
ages 3-21) a Free Appropriate Public Education (F APE) within the
6
Least Restrictive Environment (LRE).
States that successfully

I. Individuals with Disability Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446,
118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482).
2. See 20 U.S.C. § l400(c)(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (2000).

3. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(1975) (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482).
4. Brief for Nat' I Sch. Bds. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 13, Bd. of
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 212-18 (1982) (No. 80-1002), 1981 WL 389687.
5. 20 U.S.C. § l412(a)(l )(A) (2000).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2000).
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implement the EHA's provisions are eligible for federal special
7
education funding. While the lexical term "appropriate" is not
specifically defined in the EHA, the phrase "free appropriate public
education" is defined and provides the foundation for states'
accountability.
The term 'free appropriate education' means special education and
related services which
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge,
(B) meet the standards of the State Educational Agency,
(C) includes an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary

education in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education
8
program [IEP] required under section 1414(a)(5) ofthis title.
Although the phrases FAPE and LRE would reappear in later
legislation, the congressional intent behind the EHA evolved.
III. THE IDEIA AND THE PROGRESSION OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Over the next thirty years, the 1975 EHA mandate led to the
9
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) of 1997 and the
10
IDEIA of 2004,
both the quality of education and the skills of
educators advanced dramatically. Congressional intent in enacting the
most recent legislation, the IDEIA, reflects a powerful and proactive
mission in raising the educational standard and achievement level for
11
disabled students.
Providing children with disabilities entry into the
educational system is no longer the primary motivation. The evolution of
legislative intent and the congressional commitment to providing high
quality education to disabled students is explicitly clear within the
IDEIA's preamble:
Disability is a natural part of the human experience and in no way

7.
8.
(1982)).
9.
(1997).
10.
118 Stat.
11.

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)-(25)(2000).
20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982) (as cited in Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S 176, 188
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37
Individuals with Disability Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446,
2647 (2004) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482).
20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d)(1 )(A)-(C) (West 2006).
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diminishes the right of individuals to participate in or contribute to
society. Improving educational results for children with disabilities is
an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent Jiving, and economic self1
sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.

Thus, the IDEIA shows the substantial evolution in congressional
intent in many of its provisions. This evolution is evidenced in many
13
and
significant refinements in the procedural due process
14
accountability measures in the provision ofF APE within the LRE for
disabled children. The IDEIA lists the items for which states are held
15
accountable in order to be eligible for federal funding.
16
In addition, the IDEIA provides very precise definitions for three
dozen lexical terms or phrases used frequently within the Act's
17
18
provisions, such as "child with disability," "core academic subjects,"
19
20
"highly ~ualified,"
"individual education program, "
"related
22
services," and "special education." The statutory specificity of these
definitions provides the clarity necessary for implementation criteria to
23
be set.
Despite the effort made in the IDEIA to provide precise
definitions to statutory language and address issues of contention

12. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(l).
13. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415.
14. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414.
15. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a).
16. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401.
17. 20U.S.C.A. § 1401(3).
18. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(4).
19. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(10) (referring to teacher qualifications).
20. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(14).
21. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(26).
22. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(29).
23. For example, the term "Assistive Technology Service" is defined as: any service that
directly assists a child with a disability in the selection, acquisition, or use of an assistive technology
device. Such term includes-(A) the evaluation of the needs of such child, including a functional
evaluation of the child in the child's customary environment; (B) purchasing, leasing, or otherwise
providing for the acquisition of assistive technology devices by such child; (C) selecting, designing,
fitting, customizing, adapting, applying, maintaining, repairing, or replacing assistive technology
devices; (D) coordinating and using other therapies, interventions, or services with assistive
technology devices, such as those associated with existing education and rehabilitation plans and
programs; (E) training or technical assistance for such child, or where appropriate, the family of such
child; and (F) training or technical assistance for professionals (including individuals providing
education and rehabilitation services), employers, or other individuals who provide services to,
employ, or are otherwise substantially involved in the major life functions of such child.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(2).
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between parents and the state,
neither the IDE IA nor the DOE
regulations define the substantive term appropriate within the phrase
25
"appropriate education,"
the very term that provides the basis of
compliance with IDEIA.
The IDEIA, which is far more sophisticated in both its purpose and
protocols than the EHA, employs virtually the same definition of an
appropriate education:
The term 'free appropriate public education' means special education
and related services that(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State Educational Agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary
school education in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with ~e individualized education
2
program required under section 1414( d).
The DOE 2005 regulations, promulgated pursuant to the IDEIA to
interpret the Act and to direct state implementation, still do not further
clarify the term appropriate education:
Free appropriate public education or FAPE means special education
and related services that(a) Are provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge;
(b) Meet the standards of the SEA (State Educational Agency),
including the requirements of this part;
(c) Include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary
school education in the State; and
(d) Are provided in conformity with an individualized education
program (IEP) that meets the requirements of §§ 300.340-300.350.

24. Paolo Annino, The Revised IDEA: Will it Help Children with Disabilities:' 29 MENTAL &
L. RPTR. 11-14 (2005).
25. Joshua Andrew Wolfe, Note, A Search for the Best IDEA: Balancing the Conflicting
Provisions of the Individual With Disabilities Education Act, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1627, 1633-34
(2002); Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187 (1982).
26. 20 U.S.C.A. ~ 1401(9).
PHYSICAL DISABILITY
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Thus, neither the legislature nor its administrative agency provides
the specific parameters with which to measure the term appropriate.
Despite its failure to insert a definition of appropriate, Congress, in
formulating the IDEIA, was well aware of the adversarial process that
has steadily evolved over the past thirty years in determining whether
disabled children are indeed receiving an appropriate education as
mandated. The cost of litigation has been substantial, in terms of money,
time, and energy expenditure, all of which might better be used in
providing the needed education. One of the major refinements of the
IDEIA is an attempt to reduce litigation by promotin~ discussion
8
meetings and mediation as part of the due process protocols. This more
collaborative approach holds out the promise of greater policy balance
and educational benefit. However, without a clear definition of the
appropriateness feature, it is unlikely that parents and school systems
will find common ground in defining the "educational benefit" standard.
In addition to encouraging collaboration, other enormous
refinements within the IDEIA including data driven accountability
29
30
measures, higher levels of teacher qualification requirements, more
31
intensive parental involvement in IEP development or modification,
32
and incorporation of alternate dispute resolution methodologies, have
been put in place by the IDEIA.
A major improvement has been made over the previous legislation
by the merging of the accountability for Adequate Yearly Progress
33
(AYP) found in the No Child Let Behind Act of2001 (NCLB) into the
34
As one of the more recent amendments to the
IDEIA requirements.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), the NCLB
35
Act has raised the threshold of educational accountability dramatically.
The Statute itself seeks "to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and
significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a

27. 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(a)-(d) (2005).
28. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)-(f).
29. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(I)(A)(i)(IV).
30. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(10).
31. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414.
32. E.g 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e).
33. No Child Left Behind Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (coditied
as amended in scattered sections of20 U.S.C. (Supp. lll2003))
34. 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii) (Supp. Ill 2003).
35. G. RUESCH & R.L. WATERMAN. IMPACT OF THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT ON SPECIAL
EDUCATION IN WISCONSIN (Lorman Educ. Servs. 2005).
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minimum, proficiency on challenging state academic achievement
36
standards and state academic assessments."
The A YP achieved by
students receiving special education is assessed alongside their
nondisabled peers in determining whether schools are meeting these
37
mandated standards.
The A YP standard of the NCLB Act, which is
well defined, has been incorporated within the newly reauthorized IDEIA
38
of 2004.
States are now specifically accountable to provide a "highquality" of education to all students or they will be out of compliance
39
with the ESEA.
Of note, the state must establish performance goals and indicators
that promote the purposes of the IDElA and use the same definition of
40
A YP, as stated in the NCLB amendment to the ESEA. By explicitly
citing the NCLB Act within the reauthorized Act, the IDEIA mandates
states to define A YP in a manner that applies the same high standards for
academic achievement to all public elementary school and secondary
school students in the state, which results in continuous and substantial
academic improvement for all students, including students with
disabilities.
In this spirit and by the use of the higher educational standards of the
41
42
NCLB, the IDEIA and the corresponding DOE regulations provide
increasing clarity regarding both the due process rights and educational
standards to be met in educating disabled students. For the past year,
most states have been reworking their own regulations to insure
compliance with the reauthorized IDEIA and with the DOE regulations.
While these regulations are still being promulgated, increased
accountability measure~ articulated goals, and improved curricula
3
appear to be emerging.
While progress within developmental goals

36. 20 U.S.C. § 6301.
37. 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(2)(C)(i)-(v) ("'Adequately yearly progress' shall be defined by the
State in a manner that-(i) applies the same high standards of academic achievement to all public
elementary school and secondary school students in the State;. . (iii) results in continuous and
substantial academic improvement for all students; ... (v) includes separate measurable annual
objectives for continuous and substantial improvement for each of the following: (I) The
achievement of all public elementary and secondary students. (ll)(cc) [achievement ofl students with
disabilities.").
38. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(5)(C) (West 2006).
39. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)-(ii).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C).
41. 20 U.S.C. ~ 6301.
42. 34 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2006).
43. M.D. Holbrook & C. Holder. Accessing the General Curriculum: Standard-based
Instruction (Feb. 2005), http://www.alsde.edu/html/doc_download.asp''id=2882&section=65.
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44

remains an important part of a child's IEP, these life skills goals are
now better balanced with educational progress within the core academic
45
This heightened educational standard has upgraded the
subjects.
educational expectations and requirements for all students.
Despite the significant improvement of congressional statutes for
education of the disabled, the conspicuous absence of one small yet
enormously important feature-the definition of the term appropriate
with which to measure the adequacy of the educational benefit-leaves
the process substantially flawed
Therefore, despite reauthorization, reenactment, and resumed
sustained commitment to education for students with disabilities, what
remains uncertain today is the legal definition of an appropriate
education for disabled children that each state is mandated to freely and
publicly provide.
IV. THE JUDICIAL STANDARD

The right of all citizens to an education does not appear within the
U.S. Constitution. To a large extent, both the Brown v. Board of
46
Education decision in 1965 as well as the earliest disability education
47
48
cases, PARC and Mills in 1972, laid the foundation for the EHA of
1975. However, these cases were based on the Fourteenth Amendment's
49
equal protection and due process clauses, and in the case of Mills, the
50
Fifth Amendment, and not on an inherent right to education. While
there are other unenumerated Constitutional rights that are considered as
either fundamental rights for equal protection purposes (the right to
1
2
vote 5 or travel 5 ), or implied fundamental rights based on an expansive
53
.
.
.
s;r autonomy, 55 an d se If1 erty (pnvacy,
marnage,
rea d mg
o f l'b

44. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(5)(A)(l).
45. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(5)(C); 20 U.S.C. § 7801(11) (2000) ("[C]ore academic subjects'
means English, reading or language arts, mathematics, science, foreign languages, civics and
government, economics, arts, history, and geography.").
46. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. Pa. Ass'n. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F.Supp. 279 (E. D. Pa. 1972).
48. Mills v. Bd. of Educ. 348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
49. U.S.CONST. amend. XIV,§ I.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
51. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
52. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,629-30 (1969).
53. Griswold v. Conn, 381 U.S. 479,483 (1965).
54. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,384 (1978).
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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56

determination), which receive a higher level of judicial scrutiny, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that education is a state responsibility
57
and a not a Constitutional issue. As such, the Supreme Court has shied
away from examining cases on the basis of receipt of F APE and has
reiterated reliance on Congress or the states to dictate educational
. 58
po 11cy.
59
Prior to the 1982 Supreme Court decision in Rowley, there was no
single guiding judicial interpretation of the EHA. The various circuit and
state courts that addressed the EHA varied in their interpretations. For
60
example, the Eighth Circuit in 1981
held that a state provides an
appropriate educa~ion to a disabled student if it offers the "opportunity
to achieve . . . full potential commensurate with the opportunity"
provided to other [disabled and non-disabled] children. A 1981 Alabama
district court held that the purpose of the EHA was to provide "proper
educational services" to handicapped children to enable them to "become
productive citizens, contributing to society instead of beinf forced to
6
remain burdens" and to increase individual independence. The 1982
Supreme Court decision in Rowley, however, reflected a more restricted
interpretation of the educational standard and purpose employed by the
EHA.
The Rowley Court held that the language of the EHA, in light of its
legislative history, was clearly grounded in providing disabled children
with "the basic floor of opportunity" for free access to individualized
62
educational instruction and supports within the least restrictive setting.
In examining the educational needs of a hearing impaired student who
had been provided with specialized instructional supports and was
performing at above average grade level, the Rowley Court held that the
63
appropriateness requirement of the Act was met.
The requested
additional support, a sign language interpreter, which might allow
Rowley to function at her maximal level was not the responsibility ofthe
64
school to provide. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Rehnquist relied

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
(1982).
61.
62.
63.
64.

Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,270 (1990).
San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 42-43 (1973).
!d.; Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-208 (1982).
Rowley, at 176.
Springvale Sch. Dist. v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1981 ), vacated, 458 U.S. 1118
Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F.Supp. 47, 54 (N.D. Ala. 1981 ).
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201.
!d. at 209-210.
/d.at210.
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on legislative histo~ to interpret the EHA in accordance with
6
congressional intent. In 1975, congressional intent reflected the dual
priorities of insuring that disabled children were no longer excluded from
publicly supported education and that individualized support services
66
were provided to insure educational benefit from instruction.
The Rowley Court noted the clear efforts in the early 1970's, to
simply give children with disabilities an opportunity to be "served" or
publicly educated alongside their non,:disabled peers by the provision of
6
"personalized educational services." ' Because the majority of children
with disabilities were not receiving publicly supported education and the
education provided to a few disabled children was considered
inadequate, access to a public education for all disabled children was
68
Congress' primary focus. In this historical context, providing disabled
children with a free education, with the aspiration that it would benefit
them, was landmark in itself.
The Court held that the school was not responsible for providing
additional support, and noted that the EHA did not dictate the provision
69
of any specific standard of educational achievement.
The Row!~
0
Court, citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrig,uez,
1
deferred educational methodological considerations to the states. The
Court concluded that if a state complied with the EHA' s procedures and
the IEP was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
72
educational benefits, the education was appropriate.
Justice Rehnquist cautioned against over-inclusiveness in the
application of the court's narrow holding. In speaking for the majority,
Justice Rehnquist specifically stated: "Because in this case we are
presented with a handicapped child who is receiving substantial
specialized instruction and related services and who is performing above
average in the regular classroom of a public school system, we confine

65.
66.
67.
68.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

at
at
at
at

195--197.
194 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 5 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975)).
196--197 (citing S. REP. No. 94-168, at 1).
191 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 2).

69. !d. at 189 ("Noticeably absent from the language of the statute is any substantive standard
prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children.").
70. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 42--43 (1973).

71. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208.
72. !d. at 206-207 ("Therefore, a court's inquiry in suits brought under §I415(e)(2) is
twofold. First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the
individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits') If these requirements are met, the State has
complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.").
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h
.
. ,73
our ana Iys1s to t at situatiOn.
The Supreme Court has not granted certiorari for any subsequent
case challenging the appropriateness feature since the Rowley decision
and neither Congress nor the DOE has supplied clarification of the term
appropriate. Without a definition there has been and can be no
uniformity within or across states in how the term should be interpreted
or the quality of education states are mandated to provide. The Rowley
Court's conclusion that an IEP created for the disabled child must
"prov[ide] personalized instruction with sufficient support services to
74
permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction~' while
5
leaving the methodological considerations to the states,
grants
enormous deference to the State Educational Agencies (SEA) and Local
Educational Agencies (LEA), and the IEP process but no qualitative
legal guidelines. If bottom line educational criteria are met and no
significant procedural due process violations arise, the quality of
education provided to the student with disabilities has been left to the
76
states to determine. When faced with litigation by parents of disabled
children seeking to challenge the educational system's provision of
F APE, both the states and the courts have largely relied upon the Rowley
standard as their guide.
V. POST ROWLEY DECISIONS

Yet despite the remarkable thirty year evolution in the legislative
purpose as well as in the quality and scope of educational services
provided to disabled students, the narrow interpretation of the Rowley
standard, for example, the receipt of "some educational benefit" from a
77
reasonably calculated individualized plan within the least restrictive
environment, remains the vague and inconsistently applied measure of
educational appropriateness for disabled children.
State, district, and circuit courts, subsequent to Rowley, have
attempted to define "appropriate" education with little consistency or
uniformity. The Rowley standard has been interpreted both narrowly and
more broadly but never in the spirit of providing disabled students with
an education commensurate with their non-disabled peers. (See Table 1.)

73.
74.
75.
76.

!d. at 202.
!d. at 203.
!d. at 207-208.

!d. at 207.
77. !d. at 206-207.
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Generally, a court's determination of whether a disabled student is in
receipt of an appropriate education, assuming that mandated procedures
have been met, is based on a continuum of interpretations of the Rowley
standard. This continuum of decisions includes statements such as "a
78
79
basic floor of opportunity," "some educational benefit," "reasonably
80
calculated" to provide educational benefit,
not meaning "the best
81
82
possible education," not required to maximize each child's potential,
84
83
not uto~ian, more than trivial or de minimis progress, meaningful
5
86
significant learning, calculated to enable child to achieve
benefit,
87
passing marks and advance from grade to grade,
"measurable and
88
adequate ~ains in classroom,"
"gauged in relation to child's
90
potential," and "specifically designed to meet ... unique needs."
Following the decision in Rowley, many courts have latched onto the
"basic floor of opportunity" and "some educational benefit" lanfuage to
9
restrict accountability to minimal benefit in educational goals, despite
Justice Rehn~uist's caution about confining the Court's analysis to the
case at hand. (See Table 1.) Basing his opinion on the Supreme Court's

78. Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994); Leonard v. McKenzie, 869
F.2d 1558, 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1989); lndep. Sch. Dist. 283 v. S.D., 948 F.Supp 860, 885 (D. Minn.
1995).
79. A.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2004); Fayette County Bd. of Educ. v.
M.R.D., 158 S.W.3d 195,202 (Ky. 2005).
80. L.T. v. Warwick Sch. Cmty., 361 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2004); Brown v. Bartholomew
Con sol. Sch. Corp., No. 1:03-CV -00939-DFHVSS, 2005 WL 552194, at *9-1 0 (S.D. Ind. Feb 04,
2005).
81. Kenton City Sch. Dist. v. Hunt, 384 F.3d 269, 281 (6th Cir. 2004), rehearing denied, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS 24498 (U.S. App. 2004); E.S. v. lndep. Sch. Dist.,l35 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir.
1998).
82. Tucker v. Calloway Bd. ofEduc., 136 F.3d 495,505 (6th Cir. 1998); Ahem v. Keene, 593
F.Supp. 902 (D. Del. 1984 ).
83. Cone v. Randolph County Sch., 302 F. Supp.2d 500, 510 (M.D.N.C. 2004), afj"d, 103
Fed. Appx. 731, 2004 App. LEX IS 14682 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1077 (2005).
84. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999); Bd. of Educ. v. l.S.,
325 F. Supp.2d 565 (D. Md. 2004).
85. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna lndep. Unit 16,853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988).
86. Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 247.
87. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,210 (1982).
88. Devine v. Ind. River County Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1293 ( ll th Cir. 2001 ).
89. Deal v. Hamilton, 392 F.3d 840, 861-62 (6th Cir. 2004), rehearing denied, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5631 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7325 (U.S. 2005); T.R. v.
Kingwood Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 578 (3d Cir. 2000).
90. Laughlin v. Cent. Bucks, No. 9!-7333, 1994 WL 8! 14, at *I (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1994).
91. Marissa F. v. William Penn. Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.04-286, 2005 WL 2304738, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 20, 2005).
92. Rowley. 458 U.S. at 187.
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93

decision in Rodriguez, Justice Rehnquist states that "courts lack the
'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent
94
and difficult questions of educational policy,"'
and therefore
95
"questions of methodology are for resolution by the States." In a 1984
Sixth Circuit decision, only two years after Rowley, the procedure for the
determination of appropriateness was explained:
The district court's decision on whether a given educational program is
appropriate for an individual child appears to be a mixed question of
fact and law. The trial judge is required to measure the factual situation
of a handicapped child and the educational program proposed to
accommodate ~~ handicap against the legal standard of
appropnateness.

Given the tension that now exists between the statutory provisions
adopted by Congress within the reauthorized IDEIA of 2004 and the
Rowley standard used by the courts, the current legal standard of
appropriateness by which this measurement should be made remains
unclear and a source of contention.
Appropriate educational goals, therefore, have been left to the states
97
to create, with parental input, and not for the courts to dictate. Because
courts are currently required by Rowley to give deference to the states,
this limits the actions they take. If a court decides that an individualized
learning plan is not appropriate, often in response to procedural due
process violations which have negatively impacted the provision of
98
F APE, the court is not limited by a restricted Rowley interpretation and
99
assumes authority to fashion appropriate relief.
But if the IEP is
deemed appropriate, and the courts give a tfreat deal of deference to state
10
educators in making this determination,
then the states have typically
101
not been required to provide the best education,
an education that

93. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 I U.S. I, 42-43 (1973).
94. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208.
95. !d.
96. Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514,516 (6th Cir. 1984).
97. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207.
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(t)(3)(E) (2000) (new provision of the reauthorized !DEJA instructs
impartial hearing officers to base their determinations on substantive grounds rather than procedural
grounds, unless there is a direct link between the procedural violation and the denial ofF APE).
99. Diatta v. District of Columbia, 319 F.Supp. 2d 57, 63-64 (D.D.C. 2004); Rowley, 458
U.S. at 210.
I 00. Sherman v. Mamaroneck, 340 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2003); Watson v. Kingston City Sch.
Dist., 325 F. Supp. 2d 141, 144-45 (N.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 142 Fed. Appx. 9, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15534 (U.S. App. 2005).
101 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 187.

14

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2007

102

max1m1zes a disabled child's potential,
or even an education
103
commensurate with his non-disabled peers.
The recent NCLB
amendment to the ESEA stresses testing, school district accountability,
104
and A YP for all students.
These NCLB standards have been
incorporated into the IDEIA, which opened the door for challenging the
"basic floor of opportunity" level of education for disabled children. Yet,
the cases that have made their way through the state and federal courts
still have been decided using the Rowley standard to determine the level
of education that states must provide to students with disabilities in
105
compliance with the IDEA.
The enactment of the IDEIA,
incorporating the NCLB Act as an educational standard, creates a
potentially significant conflict between the terms of the Act and the
narrow interpretation of Rowley.
Although the Supreme Court could revisit Rowley and offer a more
substantive definition of "appropriateness," this is unlikely. So, despite
more sophisticated understanding of special education issues and
possibilities, with the Supreme Court reluctant to examine educational
standards and in the absence of congressional clarification, lower courts
are left with Rowley as the precedent-setting measurement standard. As
long as the Supreme Court does not overrule Rowley or refine its
interpretation in a subsequent decision, the meaning of the term
appropriate remains unclear, undefined, inconsistently applied, and a
source of frustration in educational implementation.
VI. STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN DEFINING STANDARDS

IDEIA implementation efforts by the states, frustrated by the lack of
an appropriateness definition, have also compounded the problem.
While states are responsible for the provision ofF APE within the LRE to
secure federal funding, if states do not want to apply for federal funding,
they are under no obligation to comply with the IDEIA. States have their
own constitutions and statutes to which they are accountable in
106
administering their education systems.
Each state (and the District of

102. Leonard v. McKenzie, 869 F.2d 1558, 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
103. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198-199.
104. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C) (Supp. III 2003).
105. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley. 458 U.S. 176,208 (1982); Kenton City Sch. Dist. v. Hunt. 384
F.3d 269, 281 (6th Cir. 2004), rehearing denied, 2004 U.S. App. LEX1S 24498 (U.S App. 2004);
Tucker v. Calloway Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 505 (6th Cir. 1998); Reid ex re. Reid v. District of
Columbia, 401 F.3d 516,519 (D.D.C. 2005).
106. Burke County Bd. ofEduc. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973,983 (4th Cir.1990).
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Columbia) has its own education laws and regulations guiding the
107
implementation of those laws.
Given the high costs of educating
children with disabilities, receiving federal funding is of significant
.
108
Importance to states.
States may also implement their own standards. If a state's
educational standards are more stringent than those of the federal Act,
that state is held responsible for implementing the heightened
109
In examining the statutory provisions of all fifty states (plus
standard.
the District of Columbia), with the exception of Alaska, 110 which simply
mimics the language of the federal Act as defined in Rowley, and the
111
which provides a broad definition of an
state of Washington,
appropriate education, no definition for the lexical term appropriate
appears within their constitutions, statutes, or regulations. 112 While not
clearly defining what constitutes appropriate education, all fifty states,
including the District of Columbia, do however have laws mandating the
education of children with disabilities. All of the states use language
113
. ·1 ar to th e A ct, many de1ernng
c
.
c
. 114 exp 1·ICit
. ly to th e
simi
or re1ernng
115
Act.
Missouri, prior to the EHA of 1975, maintained a more stringent
standard, but later amended its statute to track the language of the
116
California's statute explicitly states that it is not
Federal Act.

107. A.F. Blau & A.L. Allbright, 50-State Roundup: Ensuring Children with Disabilities a
Free Appropriate Puh/ic Education, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. RPTR. 1 (2006) (fiftystate, plus District of Columbia, citations of special education law in relation to FAPE).
108. Virtually all states apply for federal funding. Correspondence from U.S. Dept. of Educ.
(February 27, 2006) (on file with author).
109. !d.
110. ALASKA STAT. ~14.30.350(1) (2004) ('"[A]ppropriate education' means personalized
instruction with sufficient support services to perrrit a child to benefit educationally from the
instruction.").
111. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 28A.l55.020 (West 2006) ("[A]ppropriate education is defined
as an education directed to the unique needs, abilities, and limitations of the children with
disabilities.").
112. Blau & Allbright, supra note 107, at 1.
113. E.g. CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 56000 (West 2006).
114. E.g. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-41-101 (West 1999); MO. ANN. STAT.§ 162.670 (West 2006);
WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 21-2-501 (2005).
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)-(D) (2000).
116. McEuen v. Mo. Bd. of Educ. 120 S.W.3d 207, 209 (Mo. 2003) (Court upheld
constitutionality of state special education law changing state's maximization standard to federal
standard for educational sufficiency. The statute was amended from a "declared policy" of the state
"to provide ... all handicapped and severely handicapped children ... special education services
sufficient to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities .... " to providing "a free appropriate
education consistent with the provisions set forth in state and federal regulations implementing
[IDEA].").
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responsible for providing a hi/%her level of education than mandated by
117
1
the IDEA.
North Carolina
has enacted a more stringent statute than
119
the federal Act. However, recent Fourth Circuit decisions
have
weakened North Carolina's accountability to the statute by denying
children educational programs that provided stronger educational
services, stating that the State is not responsible for providing "utopian"
120
programs,
relying again on the Supreme Court's holding in Rowley.
Without a federal definition of what constitutes appropriateness,
either within the Act or the DOE regulations promulgated to guide states
in the enforcement of the Act, states have been free to use the minimal
Rowley definition as a guidepost for their own statutes. Given the amount
of funding that is at stake for the states, they have no incentive to
maintain a higher standard. In fact, the lack of definition in legislation
serves as a disincentive for states to pass or maintain laws with higher
standards.
Over the past thirty years, students and their school systems, have
sought to determine whether the education provided by a school district
or requested by a student complies with the EHA and its progeny, the
121
IDEA and IDEIA.
With the passage of refined educational standards
and accountability measures of the IDEA of 1997, litigation increased,
reflecting parental attempts to increase the educational standards
appropriate for their children while schools attempt to justify the
122
appropriateness of the educational levels they are already providing.
Litigation challenging procedural due process violations has been
123
considered remediable through court decision.
However, when
117. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56000 (West 2006) ("It is also the intent of the Legislature that this
part does not set a higher standard of educating individuals with exceptional needs than that
established by Congress under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.").
118. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 115C-106(a), (b) (2005) ("policy of the State is to ensure every child a
fair and full opportunity to reach his full potential" and "to provide a free appropriate publicly
supported education to every child with special needs.").
119. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna lndep. Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988) (District
court removed an autistic child from residential program at Benedictine School in Ridgely,
Maryland, where child made significant progress, returning him to local school district in North
Carolina with admittedly inferior program in accordance with his IEP; IEP held to be reasonably
calculated to provide educational benefit).
120. Harrell v. Wilson County Sch., 293 S.E.2d 687, 691 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (heightened
North Carolina standard does not require that educational authorities develop "utopian educational
program[s]" for handicapped students).
121. See generally 20 U.S.C.S. § 1412 interpretive notes and decisions 18--45 (LexisNcxis
2006).
122. See generally 28 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. RPTR. nos. 1-6 (2004); 29 MENTAL
& PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. RPTR. nos. 1--6 (2005).
123. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,210 (1982); M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d
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substantive due process issues have been the basis of an action, most
specifically when the methodologies used to assure the receipt of an
appropriate education are at issue, courts have been far more reticent to
124
substitute their own opinions for those of state professional educators.
Over the past two decades, many courts have deferred to the narrow
Rowley standard to establish whether a child's progress was in
compliance with the Act. (See Table 1.) Yet, there appear to be a number
of decisions that have used a somewhat broader interpretation of the
Rowley standard, either by examining the individual child's specific
125
or by holding schools
needs as suggested by the Rowley Court
accountable for a higher level of education, in line with the pre-Rowley
126
. .
.
b ne
. f , 127 an d th e d'1ssent m
. R owley. 128 Wh'l
d ecisiOns,
t h e amicus
1e
precedent within a state or circuit has influenced subsequent
129
the body of common law that has emerged has not woven a
decisions,
clear or cohesive picture of the specific measurement standard used when
130
assessing state compliance with the provision ofF APE.
VII. CONCLUSION
The explicit purpose of the reauthorized IDEIA has also gone much
further than its predecessors. The IDEIA ensures all children with
disabilities F APE within the LRE that emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for
131
further education, employment, and independent living.
State
agencies are basing their educational curricula on the reauthorized
IDElA and on the regulations promulgated by the DOE. There now
exists a large chasm between the Rowley standard and the standards

634, 642 (9th Cir. 2004 ).
124. Rowley. 458 U.S. at 187; J.K. v. Springville-Griffith lnst., No. 02-CV-765S, 2005 WL
711886, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. March 28, 2005).
125. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202.
126. !d. at 176; Sch. Dist. v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300,305 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1118
(1982).
I 27. Brief for Nat'] Sch. Bds. Ass'n et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 13,
Rowley, 458 U.S. I 76 (1982) (No. 80-1002), I 981 WL 389687.
128. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 212-18 (1982) (White, J., dissenting)("' agree that the language
of the Act does not contain a substantive standard beyond requiring that the education offered must
be 'appropriate."').
129. See San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (1973); Rowley, 458 U.S.
at I 87 (I 982 ).
I 30. See infra tbl. 1.
131. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414 (West 2006).
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incorporated in the Act itself. The minimal Rowley standard of providing
the bottom floor educational opportunity, the promise of "some
educational benefit," or the provision of some progress towards a
132
reasonably calculated individual plan
no longer can be seen as the
attributes of an appropriate educational plan for a child with disabilities.
In the absence of a congressionally supplied definition of the term
appropriate, and with no definition forthcoming from the DOE, the
chasm will inevitably grow wider.
The lack of a substantive definition of the appropriateness standard
has caused substantial litigation between school systems and parents of
children with disabilities. Even a general definition of the term
"educational appropriateness," as education that supports a quantifiable
measure of meaningful and adequate progress towards achieving skills to
promote literacy, communication and self-sufficiency, might be enough,
if stated within the IDEIA itself or within the DOE's regulations. The
achievement of educational adequacy can no longer focus upon minimal
educational benefit, based on a state's unguided standard of appropriate
goals. As long as individualized special education and support services
are provided in the LRE, the student is making some progress towards
reasonably calculated goals, and proper procedure has been followed,
states have been given latitude to do as little as is warranted to comply
with the Act. Valid requests for more effective educational methods have
133
been seen as "maximizing potential"
or providing "utopian"
134
measures.
Yet, methodological considerations make a substantial
difference in the rate or even ability of a child with disabilities to learn
what is clearlY. prerequisite to self sufficiency as currently mandated
w1t. h'm the A ct. 135
Without a clear federal definition to support the IDEIA, a source of
controversy, dispute, and litigation may exist for years to come. The
DOE has had the opportunity to refine this ambiguous standard by
incorporating a definition for the term appropriate within the guidelines
they have promulgated for the !DEJA. Before the dust settles on the

132. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 187.
133. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42-43.
134. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Indep. Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988).
135. Marissa F. v. William Penn. Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.04-286, 2005 WL 2304738, at *4 (E. D.
Pa. Sept. 20, 2005). See also Deal v. Hamilton, 392 F.3d 840, 861-62 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that in
assessing differences in methodologies, while states, as noted by the Rowley ruling, are not required
to maximize each child's potential, "at some point this facile answer becomes insufficient. .
[T]here is a point at which the difference in outcomes between the two methods can be so great that
provision of the lesser program could amount to denial of FAPE.").

I]

THE RIGHT TO AN "APPROPRIATE" EDUCATION

19

enactment of the DOE's regulations for this very comprehensive and
well-crafted Act, it would be wise for this administrative body to insure
the inclusion of this long absent definition. States have been awaiting the
finalization of the DOE regulations to ensure that their own standards are
in compliance with the !DEJA. The pressures of the moment make it all
the more important for the DOE or some other authoritative federal
source to resolve this open question.
TABLE I: COURTS APPLICATION OF ROWLEY STANDARD

<:II

Cases

....ell

1J)

Ahem v. Keene, 593
F.Supp. 902 (D. Del.
1984).
Polk v. Cent.
Susquehanna Indep.
Unit 16, 853 F.2d
171,184(3dCir.
1988) (cert. denied
1989).
Leonard v.
McKenzie, 869 F.2d
1558, 1561 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).

....
(.J

'i:
....

"'
Q

....

·s
(.J

I.

Interpretation of Standard

0
States not required to provide best
education money can buy nor one
which maximizes handicapped child's
potential.

X

X

Meaningful benefit

X

Some educational benefits (not
maximizing potential); basic floor of
opportunity.

Laughlin v. Cent.
Bucks, No. 91-7333,
1994 WL 8114 at* I
(E.D.Pa. Jan. 12,
1994).

X

Independent School
District 283 v. SD
948 F. Sup 860 (D.
Minn. 1995).

X

"Appropriate education" does not
mean best or potential maximizing
education; basic floor of opportunity
through individually designed
educational benefit to child.
Specifically designed to meet unique
needs supported by services to permit
benefit.
IEP must be reasonably calculated to
receive educational benefit, more than
trivial or deminimus progress.
IDEA does not require educational
benefits to maximize potential but
merely offers basic floor of
opportunity to progress within his
education.

Union Sch. Dist. v.
Smith, 15 F.3d 1519,
1524(9thCir.l994).

X
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.....

Cases

.....CCIQ.l

.....

00

.........C.l
.....
....."'
Q

E.S. v. Indep. Sch.
Dist.,l35 F.3d 566,
569 (8th Cir. 1998).

.....
.....
=
C.l
.........

Tucker v. Calloway
Bd. ofEduc., 136
F.3d 495, 505 (6th
Cir. 1998).

X

Ridgewood Bd. of
Educ. v. N.E., 172
F.3d 238, 247 (3d
Cir. 1999).

X

McEuen v. Mo. Bd.
ofEduc. 120 S.W.3d
207,209 (Mo. 2003)

Cone v. Randolph
County Sch., 302 F.
Supp.2d 500,510
(M.D.N.C. 2004),
aff'd, 103 Fed. Appx.
731, 2004 App.
LEXIS 14682 (4th
Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct.
1077 (2005).

School's placement upheld if
reasonably calculated to provide
educational benefits; appropriate
public education does not mean
absolutely best or potential
maximizing.
IEP must provide more than trivial
educational benefit for educational
appropriateness; significant learning
and meaningful benefit are required to
meet higher standard of the IDEA.
Meaningful educational benefit must
be gauged in relation to child's
potential.

X

Appropriate education means that
child is making measurable and
adequate gains in classroom.

X

X

IDEA does not require best possible
education.

X

X

A.B.v.Lawson,354
F.3d315,319(4th
Cir. 2004).

Interpretation of Standard

u
X

T.R. v. Kingwood
Bd. of Educ., 205
F.3d 572, 578 (3d
Cir. 2000).
Devine v. Indiana
River County Sch.
Bd., 249 F.3d 1289,
1293 (11th Cir.
2001).

[2007

aff

Constitutional for State to reduce
"maximization standard" policy to
less stringent Federal standard for
educational sufficiency.
IEP held if reasonably calculated to
provide some educational benefit.
Local schools deserve latitude in
determining lEPs most appropriate for
a disabled child.

NC State policy "to ensure every child
a fair and full opportunity to reach full
potential" but not "utopian
educational program for handicapped
students."
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LT. v. Warwick Sch.
Cmty., 361 F.3d 80,
83 (1st Cir. 2004).
Watson v. Kingston
City Sch. Dist. 325
F. Supp. 2d 141,
144-45 (N.D.N.Y.
2004), aff'd, 142
Fed. Appx. 9; 2005
U.S. App. LEXIS
15534 (U.S. App.
2005).
Bd. ofEduc. V. I.S.,
325 F. Supp.2d 565
(D. Md. 2004).
Kenton City Sch.
Dist. v. Hunt, 384
F.3d 269, 281 (6th
Cir. 2004), rehearing
denied, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24498
_(_U.S. App. 2004}.
Bucks County Dept,
of MHR v. Penn
379 F.3d 61
(3'd circuit 2004).
Deal v. Hamilton,
392 F.3d 840, 861-62
(6th Cir. 2004),
rehearing denied,
2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5631 (6th
Cir. 2004 ), cert.
denied, 2005 U.S.
LEXIS 7325 (U.S.
2005).
Fayette County Bd.
ofEduc. v. M.R.D.,
158 S.W.3d 195, 202
(Ky. 2005).

X

X

aff

Interpretation of Standard
Not required to provide what is best
for a special needs child; "reasonably
calculated" to provide an
"appropriate" education as defined in
federal and state law.

Methodological considerations must
be left to state and local schools deference due; not for Federal courts
to judge.

Did not provide FAPE - child made de
minimus progress on old IEP and new
IEP was identical.

X

X

X
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Appropriate education is "not
synonymous with best possible
education" nor is it an education that
enables a child to achieve his or her
full potential.

X

A somewhat broader interpretation of
the term "appropriate" determining
that Courts can remedy if IEP is found
insufficient

X

"Requires IEP to confer meaningful
educational benefit gauged in relation
to child's potential."
" ... there is a point at which the
difference in outcomes between two
methods can be so great that provision
of lesser program could amount to
denial ofFAPE."
Some educational benefit conferred
with student progressing academically
is in receipt ofF APE.
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Cases
Brown v.
Bartholomew
Consol. Sch. Corp.,
2005 WL552194 at
*9-10 (S.D. Ind.
2005).
J.K. v. SpringvilleGriffith lnst.,.No. 02CV-765S, 2005 WL
711886 at *10
(W.D.N.Y. March
28, 2005).
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Interpretation of Standard

X

IEP reasonably calculated to provide
educational benefit.

X

" ... educational strategy and
methodology requiring deference to
expertise of administrative offices."

Reid ex re. Reid v.
District of Columbia,
401 F.3d 516, 519
(D.D.C. 2005).
Marissa F. v.
William Penn. Sch.
Dist., No. Civ.A.04286,2005 WL
2304738 at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 20, 2005).
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X

X

At a minimum provide personalized
instruction with sufficient support to
permit child to benefit educationally
from that instruction .. .if in regular
class ... reasonably calculated to
enable child to achieve passing marks
and advance from grade to grade.
IEP sufficient as provided minimal
education benefit. "[I]t is not the
court's place to substitute its idea of
good educational policy for ideas and
techniques adopted by Pennsylvania
educators."

